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Public Lawyers and
Marijuana Regulation
Sam Kamin and Eli Wald

A

lthough 23 states and the District of Columbia have now
legalized marijuana for medical purposes, marijuana remains
a prohibited substance under federal law. Even in Washington and
Colorado, which have “legalized”
marijuana use by adults, all marijuana conduct remains every bit as
illegal as it does in other states — at
least as far as the federal government
is concerned. Because the production,
sale, possession and use of marijuana remain illegal, there is a risk of
prosecution under federal laws. Furthermore, those who help marijuana
users and providers put themselves
at risk — federal law punishes not
only those who violate drug laws but
also those who assist or conspire with
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them to do so. In the case of lawyers
representing marijuana users and businesspeople, this means not only the
real (though remote) risk of criminal
prosecution but also the more immediate risk of professional discipline.
In 2013, we wrote about the difficult
place in which lawyers find themselves when representing marijuana
clients.1 We argued previously that
while both the criminal law and the
rules of professional conduct rightly
require legal obedience from lawyers, other countervailing pressures
must be considered when evaluating
lawyers’ representation of marijuana
clients. In particular, we argued that
considerations of equity and access
to justice weigh dispositively in favor
of protecting lawyers who endeavor
to help their clients comply with state

marijuana laws, and we suggested
means of interpreting relevant criminal
law provisions and rules of professional conduct to achieve this result.
This article builds on that analysis, taking on the particular issue of
the public lawyer’s’ role in marijuana
regulation. For government lawyers,
the key issues in exercising discretion in the context of marijuana are not
clients’ access to the law and equality but rather determining the clients’
wishes and serving them diligently
and ethically. Lawyers representing
state agencies, legislatures and the
executive branch of government draft
and interpret the rules and regulations regarding marijuana. Lawyers for
federal, state and local governments
then interpret those rules to determine
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the obligations and responsibilities
of those they represent and to help
their clients meet those obligations
and carry out their required tasks.
Both state and federal prosecutors are
charged with determining what conduct remains illegal under the new
rules and, perhaps more importantly,
with exercising discretion regarding
whom to prosecute and to what extent.

Today’s State of Marijuana
Law and Rules of Professional
Conduct2
Any conversation about the legal status of marijuana must reiterate that
marijuana is not “legal” anywhere in
the United States. While an ever-growing number of states have curtailed,
amended or otherwise weakened their
own marijuana prohibitions, the federal government has not. Marijuana
remains a Schedule I narcotic, a drug
whose manufacture, distribution and
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possession remain serious felonies
punishable by long terms of imprisonment. The U.S. Supreme Court has
upheld the power of the federal government to regulate marijuana3 and
has held that compliance with state
law is not a defense in a prosecution
under federal criminal provisions.4
For private lawyers representing
clients in the marijuana industry, this
means exposure to criminal liability
for aiding and abetting their clients’
marijuana conduct and discipline
for counseling or assisting that conduct. We have proposed that both of
these concerns ought to be addressed
in favor of permitting attorney advice
regarding marijuana conduct in
order to ensure clients’ access to law,
lawyers and legal advice. Our proposed approach seems to have been
embraced. To the best of our knowledge, no lawyer has been prosecuted
for aiding and abetting a client’s marijuana activity except in circumstances
where lawyers were alleged to have
formed an intent to assist clients above
and beyond simply representing them
qua lawyers. And we are aware of no
attempt by a state ethics board to discipline lawyers for assisting clients’
marijuana activity.
Indeed, some jurisdictions have
revised their rules of professional
conduct to explicitly allow lawyers
to represent clients in the marijuana
industry.5 In Colorado, for example,
Rule 1.2(d) continues to state that “[a]
lawyer shall not counsel a client to
engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent. ...”6 However, after much
debate, the Colorado Supreme Court
added Comment 14 to Rule 1.2, which
states that a lawyer may assist a client
in conduct that the lawyer reasonably believes is permitted by the state’s
marijuana laws.7 While our approach
— construing the term assist in Rule
1.2(d) to require a true intent — was
not adopted by the court, the same
result is ultimately achieved. Either
approach gives clients greater access to
lawyers and legal advice while putting
to rest lawyers’ fear of discipline for
giving that advice.
As civil servants, many have likely

taken an oath to uphold the laws and
Constitution of the United States as
well as those of their own jurisdiction.
Thus, if they play a role in facilitating
marijuana use — either by regulating
it, collecting the tax revenues from it,
or helping create rules to govern the
(still illegal) manufacture and sale of
it — they may find their professional
role in conflict with their oath.

The Role of Public Lawyers
in Marijuana Regulation and
Decriminalization
Our approach to the regulation of
private lawyers — permitting the
representation of marijuana clients
seeking to conform to state law as long
as the lawyer does not form the intent
to assist in a client’s criminal activity
— applies to public lawyers as well.
Public lawyers will rarely, if ever,
be perceived as having the intent to
encourage criminal conduct on the
part of their clients. Unlike private
lawyers who choose to take on marijuana practitioners and users as clients,
the public lawyer generally does not
choose clients or the issues they raise.
If the regulation of marijuana becomes
one of the topics assigned to public
lawyers, they must simply add that
expertise to their portfolio. Relatedly,
public lawyers’ well-being does not
rise and fall on the financial success of
their clients. As a result, public lawyers are rightly perceived as having
goals independent of those whom they
represent.
Perhaps more fundamentally, it is
rarely true that the government lawyer’s client is violating federal law,
even if the client is involved in one
way or another in the regulation of
a legal marijuana market. To see this
more clearly, consider an actual lawsuit brought on behalf of the city of
Garden Grove in California.8 A law
enforcement official had wrongly confiscated medical marijuana belonging
to Felix Kha and was ordered by the
trial court to return Kha’s medicine to
him. The city sued to enjoin the order,
arguing that doing so would make
the officer and the city complicit in the
distribution of a controlled substance
and in aiding and abetting Kha’s
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possession of that substance. The California courts rejected this contention,
noting that the city could not be seen
as possessing the requisite intent to
violate federal law:
To be liable as an aider and
abettor, a defendant must not
only know of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, he must
also have the specific intent to
commit, encourage or facilitate the commission of the
offense. Stated differently, the
defendant must associate himself
with the venture and participate in it as in something that he
wishes to bring about and seek
by his actions to make it succeed. Even though Kha would
be in violation of federal law by
possessing marijuana, it is rather
obvious the City has no intention to facilitate such a breach. Its
challenge to the superior courts
[sic] order is clear proof of that,
and in future cases the existence
of case law compelling it will
resolve this issue.9
Here, the court was writing about
the culpability of lay employees; but
for the lawyer working on behalf of a
public entity, the case is more starkly
clear. The public entity that the lawyer represents is not seeking to aid and
abet the use of marijuana by those that
it regulates, and the lawyer who helps
the state achieve its goals is a further
step removed from such intent.
Furthermore, while many of the
access to justice and fairness concerns that motivate our conclusion
with regard to private lawyers do not
apply when considering the conduct
of public lawyers, it would certainly
be perverse to allow private marijuana
parties to be represented by counsel
but to deny the government that benefit. Complex regulatory apparatuses
require the participation of attorneys
not merely on the side of the regulated but on the side of the regulator as
well. In this sense, the interest in equal
access to justice also argues in favor of
permitting public lawyers to engage in
this representation.
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How Public Lawyers Can
Represent their Clients
Effectively and Ethically
While the concerns of private lawyers center upon whether they can
represent marijuana clients without
violating criminal law and the rules
of professional conduct, public lawyering in this area primarily raises
questions of how to represent the client
effectively and ethically. Specifically,
public lawyers confront two unique
and intertwined challenges when
compared to private lawyers: (1) determining the appropriate allocation of
authority/communication between
lawyer and client and (2) exercising
professional judgment.
Private lawyers representing clients
in the marijuana industry know or can
easily ascertain their clients’ objectives.
A typical client might, for example,
seek a lawyer’s help in obtaining a
license to own and operate a dispensary. And if questions arise during the
representation — regarding the cost
of the license, disclosures that would
have to be made to the government
agency in order to obtain the license,
other business interests that might be
jeopardized by licensure, etc. — the
lawyer can usually consult with the
client and obtain guidance regarding
how to proceed.
In contrast, government lawyers
engaged in marijuana regulation
sometimes find themselves in a
challenging situation in which the
objectives of the client are unclear and
ascertaining them may not be possible.
A few examples illustrate the point.
Issue: Enforcement and Changing
Public Opinion
Consider a state attorney general (AG)
deciding whether to enforce the state’s
criminal laws in a jurisdiction that has
not legalized medical marijuana but
has a large underground marijuana
industry. On the one hand, the AG has
a duty to enforce the state’s laws as
written, and doing so generally serves
the interests of the people (the AG’s
client). An AG taking such a position would strictly enforce her state’s
criminal laws, legitimately reasoning that if the people wish to amend

their laws to legalize or decriminalize marijuana, then they ought to do so
but that until such time she will enforce
the state’s existing laws as written. On
the other hand, laws sometimes linger
on the books long after the electorate
has lost enthusiasm for them (sodomy
laws, for example). In that case, an AG
might legitimately exercise her prosecutorial discretion and professional
judgment and either refuse to enforce
those laws as written or else be very
selective about which cases to prosecute
under such a statute. Even in states that
have amended their marijuana laws to
permit certain marijuana use, difficult
questions remain regarding how literally law enforcement should enforce
those criminal laws that remain on the
books.10 Absent a specific statutory
answer, how should a prosecutor react
to changing public opinion with regard
to marijuana-related conduct?
Issue: Consultation with Highest
Authority
ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.13 defines and details communications with an organizational
client, including an electorate.11 It essentially guides the AG to consult with
the highest authority that is authorized
to speak on behalf of the people — in
most cases, the governor of the state.
Practically speaking, however, a governor may not wish to decide the issue
and may leave it to the AG’s discretion.
Furthermore, an AG seeking in good
faith to determine the will of the people should be mindful of the fact that
a governor may be as concerned with
her political fortune and appeasing her
political constituency as she is with
ascertaining the true will of the people.
Moreover, even if the governor is willing to offer guidance about the will of
the people, it is sometimes appropriate
for an AG (or any other lawyer) to not
follow or participate in the implementation of certain policies because they are
illegal, immoral or dangerous. Put differently, an AG should not reflexively
take the position that “my constituents/clients wanted work done in this
area so I did it” without independently
assessing the legality and morality of
the underlying policies.
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The role of lawyers in drafting the
“Torture Memo” and in otherwise
approving the wartime practices of the
Bush administration serve as a cautionary tale for a public lawyer who
would blindly follow the requests of
her client.12 Communication with the
client and determining the client’s
wishes with regard to a particular policy outcome is a necessary but not a
sufficient requirement of public lawyers practicing ethically in this context.
Issue: Marijuana Law Reform and
Agency Funding
Furthermore, consider a lawyer in a
jurisdiction that has legalized medical marijuana who represents a state
agency that receives significant federal funding. Should the lawyer
advise her client to proceed with
marijuana law reform even if such
participation may jeopardize the
agency’s federal funding? It seems
to us that the attorney’s obligation, at a minimum, is to inform her
agency and the public of the possible
negative consequences of pursuing
marijuana law reform and to work
diligently on behalf of her clients
whether they determine that the policy decision is worth the risk or not.
Of course, the question remains of
how the attorney should go about
informing her client of the risks and
determining the client’s views on the
subject.

Conclusion
Marijuana regulation is not a niche
area of government regulation; it will
influence the practice of virtually every
public lawyer in the years to come.
Public lawyers must understand the
changes in marijuana law and the
implications for government clients.
Given the pervasiveness of the modern regulatory state, the situation is no
easier — and, in many ways, it is more
complicated — for public lawyers than
it is for private ones.
To be sure, public lawyers face myriad practice challenges with respect
to marijuana law reform, and we do
not pretend that we have resolved
all of the issues that are sure to arise.
The legal status of many actors is
T H E PU B L I C L A W Y E R

uncertain whenever state law permits
conduct that is expressly forbidden
by the federal government. We hope
that public lawyers will be alert to the
risks involved in participating in marijuana regulation so that they can think
carefully about their obligations when
these issues arise. n
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